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Abstract
The recent literature has brought together the characteristics model of utility and
classic revealed preference arguments to learn about consumers￿willingness to pay.
We incorporate market pricing equilibrium conditions into this setting. This allows us
to use observed purchase prices and quantities on a large basket of products to learn
about individual household￿ s willingness to pay for characteristics, while maintaining
a high degree of ￿ exibility and also avoiding the biases that arise from inappropriate
aggregation.
We illustrate the approach using scanner data on food purchases to estimate bounds
on willingness to pay for the organic characteristic. We combine these estimates with
information on households￿ stated preferences and beliefs to show that on average
quality is the most important factor a⁄ecting bounds on household willingness to pay
for organic, with health concerns coming second, and environmental concerns lagging
far behind.
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Researchers often want to estimate the value that consumers place on a speci￿c characteristic.
For example, to evaluate the consumer bene￿ts of organic farming, researchers need an
estimate of willingness to pay for the organic characteristic in organic products. When the
number of relevant products is small, or when utility is a separable function of a small number
of aggregates, hedonic price or discrete choice demand methods can be used to estimate this
willingness to pay. However, these methods cannot be easily adapted to estimate willingness
to pay when a consumer chooses to buy hundreds of items from a choice set with tens of
thousands of options. When consumers buy a large basket of goods and separability is not
invoked classical demand methods are required to model interactions across goods. In an
important recent contribution, Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008) improve our ability to
estimate consumers￿willingness to pay by embedding a characteristics model of utility in a
classic revealed preference setting. However, their methods remain intractable when there
are more than a few relevant characteristics. What is needed is a method to marry hedonic
price methods to revealed preference methods for analysing baskets of goods.
We combine methods from the hedonic pricing literature with revealed preference ideas
from Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008) to show how these can be applied to analyse will-
ingness to pay when consumers purchase continuous quantities of a high dimensional basket
of goods. Thus, we show how disaggregate analysis of a seemingly impossibly high dimen-
sional dataset can be made tractable. Further, we extend the revealed preference approach
by incorporating market pricing conditions. We demonstrate how this approach allows us to
learn about consumers￿willingness to pay for characteristics using feasible methods, while
avoiding unnecessary separability assumptions and aggregation bias. A major bene￿t of our
approach is that we can examine rich data with minimal assumptions. A cost is that we are
only able to estimate bounds on willingness to pay.
We apply this approach to an issue of empirical interest; we estimate bounds on willing-
ness to pay for organic foods and show how these are related to demographic characteristics
1and to consumers￿stated preferences and beliefs about health, the environment and product
quality. These estimates can inform regulation over the licensing and labelling of organic
foods, increase government knowledge about consumer valuations of agricultural and envi-
ronmental policies, and help give ￿rms a better understanding of the potential pro￿tability
of new product lines.
In the consumer demand literature, our work is most directly related to Blow, Browning
and Crawford (2008), who develop non-parametric revealed preference methods to estimate
willingness to pay for characteristics and apply them to organic milk sales in Denmark. We
discuss this paper and its relation to our work in section 2.5. In the hedonic literature,
our work is most closely related to papers that focus on discrete choices in imperfectly
competitive markets such as Pakes (2003), Bajari and Benkard (2005a,b), and Erickson,
Pakes, and Center (2008).1 Also related is the industrial organisation literature that applies
discrete choice demand methods to model demand for single categories of products.2
Our work is also related to the price index literature. The most closely related papers are
Hausman (2003), Pakes (2003), and Triplett (2005). Triplett (2005) presents a comprehensive
discussion of uses of hedonic methods in constructing price indexes. E⁄ectively, what we do
is compute consumer speci￿c hedonic price indexes and analyse the implications of these
for consumer valuation of organic foods. Although there is no simple relationship between
hedonic prices and consumer valuation, since the hedonic price function is determined by
the interaction of demand, cost and competitive conditions (Hausman (2003)), we exploit
the idea that the hedonic price is a lower bound to compensating variation.
It has long been understood that analogues of classic revealed preference arguments apply
to hedonic prices (see for example Scotchmer (1985), Kanemoto (1988), Pollak (1989), and
Pakes (2003)). These papers show that hedonic prices can be used to bound willingness to pay
1Also related are papers studying hedonic prices in competitive markets in labor economics (Sattinger
(1995), Leeth and Ruser (2003)), in environmental economics (Freeman (1995), Smith and Huang (1995),
Chay and Greenstone (2005), Sieg et al. (2004)) and urban and public economics (Epple and Sieg (1999)).
2See, for example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), Smith (2004), and Gri¢ th, Nesheim,
O￿ Connell (2010). Also related is the discrete choice demand literature, e.g. McFadden (1974) and Train
(2003).
2and willingness to accept. We build on Scotchmer (1985) and Pollak (1989) to develop the
argument when consumer choice involves choice of a discrete option along with a continuous
intensity of use for a basket of goods. The fact that a consumer paid a premium to purchase
a basket of goods implies that the consumer must have been willing to pay at least as much
as the premium.3 Our work is also inspired by the growing interest in partially identi￿ed
models (e.g. Manski (2003), Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007)).
We are in part motivated by the fact that detailed transaction level data on consumer
expenditures - which include precisely measured item level prices, quantities and product
characteristics - are now widely available for many di⁄erent goods and in many countries.4
In our case, our sample is representative of the entire retail grocery market in the UK. The
richness of these data are both a blessing and a curse. Discrete choice demand methods,
are not tractable for such a large number of product groups. Classical demand methods
cannot cope with the large number of zeros in the consumer demand system. Methods such
as those introduced by Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008) are not able to deal with the
large dimensionality of the characteristic space.
In our application, we use data on each item in the household￿ s food basket, to estimate
bounds on willingness to pay for the organic characteristic. We estimate these bounds both
for individual product categories and for the entire household food basket. The former
bound provides evidence on the importance of organic for individual product lines. The
latter provides evidence on the overall consumer valuation properly weighted by expenditure
shares.
We show that there is substantial heterogeneity in organic price premia across products
3The bound is not structural except under very restrictive assumptions. It may change when market
prices change. To estimate structural demand parameters or supply parameters one must use techniques
such as those in Epple and Sieg (1999), Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Smith (2004), Bajari and
Benkard (2005a), or Heckman, Matzkin and Nesheim (2010).
4For example, data on grocery purchases are available from market research ￿rms, such as AC Nielsen
and Kantar (previously TNS), in the US, Canada, the UK and many European countries. Work using
these data has looked either at the aggregate basket of groceries (e.g. Smith, 2004) or at single product
categories, for example, breakfast cereals (Nevo, 2001), ketchup (Pesendorfer, 2002), yoghurt (Ackerberg,
2001) or carbonated soft drinks (Dube, 2005).
3and across households. For products, organic price premia range from -41% to 142% with
most of the price premia (80% of them) ranging from 15% to 70%. For households, lower
bounds on willingness to pay for the entire basket range from 0 to over £100 per year. 23%
have a lower bound of zero and nearly 10% have a lower bound larger than £10 per year.
We also ￿nd that consumers vary in the reasons they are willing to pay for organic prod-
ucts, with product quality and health being the most important factors and environmental
concerns lagging far behind. Aggregating our results, we estimate that the total lower bound
on willingness to pay for health is around £17m, for the environment around £5m, and for
quality around £18m. These results have implications for the regulation of organic labelling,
and for the way that ￿rms may want to advertise organic products.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the theoretical
background. Section 3 describes the data, our empirical implementation and presents esti-
mates of the lower and upper bounds on households￿willingness to pay for organic. Section
3.4 considers the extent to which this willingness to pay re￿ ects concerns about the envi-
ronment, health or quality and analyses some implications of the results. A ￿nal section
summarises and makes some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical background
We employ a rational choice model of a price-taking consumer who maximises utility. At
each point in time, the consumer chooses a shopping basket given the set of products and
stores in the market and the prices of all products. Prices are set by ￿rms in an unspeci￿ed
pricing equilibrium. The consumer￿ s choice reveals bounds on their willingness to pay for
speci￿c characteristics available in the market.
Our approach to identifying a lower and upper bound on willingness to pay requires the
following assumptions, which are common to most of the applied demand literature:
1. Utility depends on observable characteristics that are well measured in our data and
possibly on unobserved characteristics that are mean independent of the observed char-
4acteristics.
2. Consumers maximise utility, have complete knowledge of the market environment and
incur no search frictions.
3. The market sets an equilibrium price for each product and the set of marketed products
is rich enough to allow consumers to e⁄ectively unbundle product characteristics.
To ￿x ideas, we follow Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008) and use the example of the
organic characteristic, but, the approach could be applied to any other characteristic, for
example brand name or whether a product is low-fat. To develop intuition we ￿rst describe
the single product case. We then describe the market environment, before extending the
analysis to the choice of a basket of products, some fraction of which have the organic
characteristic, to show how estimates of hedonic price premia from disaggregate purchase
data can be correctly aggregated.
2.1 Demand for a single product
In the single product discrete choice model, a consumer maximises utility by choosing one
product from a ￿nite number of options, each described by a vector of characteristics and
a price. Let z 2 Z ￿ Rn be the vector of all product characteristics that a⁄ect consumer
choice.5 Let z (j) be the j0th coordinate of the characteristic vector and let z (1) be the
relevant characteristic of interest. In our example, z (1) = 1 if a product is organic and
z (1) = 0 otherwise. The product price is given by p = h(z), where h(z) is an equilibrium
hedonic price de￿ned for all z 2 Z:6 We discuss the market environment and determination
of prices in section 2.2.
5To simplify notation in this section, we use z to represent the vector of all product characteristics.
Later, in Section 3.2, we change notation slightly and use z to represent the vector of observable product
characteristics and " to represent unobservable characteristics.
6Note that the hedonic price is de￿ned for all z 2 Z even those that are not sold in equilibrium: See Ekeland
(2010) or Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) for a discussion of equilibrium pricing of products that
are not sold.
5Consider a consumer (indexed h for household) with characteristics xh who buys a single
unit of an organic product o with product characteristics zo and price po and elects not to
buy a non-organic product n with characteristics zn and price pn: The vector xh includes
measured characteristics as well as unmeasured heterogeneity and preference shocks such as
the arrival of household visitors, weather, travel cost shocks, or random variation in who
within the household does the shopping. Note that our speci￿cation encompasses standard
discrete choice models such as the mixed logit.
Assume that o and n are identical in all dimensions other than organic. Let the consumer￿ s
indirect utility function be denoted v (xh;z;p), where v is increasing in z (1); continuously
di⁄erentiable in p and strictly decreasing in p: If the consumer chooses the organic product,
then standard revealed preference arguments imply
v (xh;z
o;p
o) ￿ v (xh;z
n;p
n); (1)
the consumer obtains weakly greater utility from the organic product. By the mean value













@p > 0 is the marginal utility of income. After rearranging, we have







The left side of this expression is the willingness to pay for the organic characteristic when
we consider a single organic item. The right side is the organic price premium. Revealed
preference implies that willingness to pay is at least as big as the price premium. For all
consumers that we observe buying organic, the price premium de￿nes a lower bound on their
willingness to pay for organic. For all consumers that do not buy organic, the price premium
provides an upper bound on their willingness to pay for organic.
To make use of this inequality, we must observe or estimate po ￿pn: We next discuss the
market environment that generates prices.
62.2 Market environment
The prices that we observe are equilibrium outcomes in the market, as has been emphasized
in much of the recent hedonic and industrial organization literatures (Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995), Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2004), Bajari and Benkard( 2004)). For a
single food category they are described by the hedonic price function
p = h(z):
In the markets we consider (UK retail grocery markets), there is e⁄ectively no price discrim-
ination conditional on observed product characteristics. On the demand side, consumers
shopping in the same market at the same time face the same menu of prices. Similar goods
selling for di⁄erent prices are indeed di⁄erent goods. For example, two di⁄erent pack sizes
of the same brand of product are distinct because their storeability characteristics vary. The
same brand sold in a large, out-of-town store and a convenience store is not the same product
because the stores di⁄er in their service and location characteristics.
On the supply side, grocery markets are typi￿ed by oligopolistic competition - a small
number of ￿rms sell a large number of di⁄erentiated products to a large number of consumers.
Our approach is consistent with the set of products and the price premia that we observe
being determined in an oligopoly marketing and pricing game in which each ￿rm chooses
what products to sell and for what price. To study demand we do not need to be speci￿c
about the nature of this pricing game, other than to assume that 1) all consumers face
the same prices, and 2) the observed market outcomes re￿ ect the technological feasibility of
producing and selling various products, the cost structure of ￿rms, the nature of competition
in the market, and the distribution of demand across locations and products.
2.3 Demand for a basket
When a consumer buys a basket of goods, some organic and some not, their willingness to
pay is de￿ned in terms of the characteristics of all the goods and the total cost of the basket.
7Some baskets are more organic than others; they have a larger fraction of items that are
organic. We de￿ne a non-organic basket to be one in which no products are organic. A fully
organic basket is one in which all products are organic.
Let B be the ￿nite set of all products in the market. Partition the set into G categories,
with each category labeled by an integer g 2 f1;:::;Gg: Let Bg be the set of products in
category g and B =
S
g2G
Bg: Each product b 2 Bg has a vector of characteristics zb 2 Zg ￿ Rng
that a⁄ect utility. The set Zg is the set of feasible characteristics for product category g: As
in the single product example above, we assume that zb (1) = 1 if and only if b is organic.
We de￿ne z = fzbgb2B to be the vector of all characteristics of all products.
The price of each product is pb and the vector of all prices is p. As discussed in Section
2.2, prices are set in an oligopolistic equilibrium game. For each category g; the price of
product b is given by pb = hg (zb) where hg is the hedonic price function for category g: For
each g; the function hg is de￿ned for all z 2 Zg including those not sold in equilibrium.
It is convenient to work in terms of the consumer expenditure function. Let v = v (xh;z;p)
be the maximum utility obtainable given market prices p and product characteristics z: Each
consumer chooses a vector of quantities of each product, qh to minimise costs of attaining




fp ￿ q subject to u(xh;z;q) ￿ vg:
In general, the basket purchased will include both organic and non-organic products and the
fraction organic will vary across consumers.
For each consumer, we observe the actual basket purchased and the price and character-
istics of all items purchased. How do we de￿ne willingness to pay for organic? In the discrete
choice case, willingness to pay is de￿ned with respect to an alternative that is identical in
every dimension except organic. When the consumer purchases a basket, however, there are
multiple dimensions of organic, one for each product in the basket. We de￿ne willingness
to pay to be the di⁄erence in expenditure between the amount actually spent and what
8would have been spent if all organic items were transformed into non-organic while holding
utility constant. We calculate the lower bound on willingness to pay by comparing the
consumer￿ s actual expenditure to what would have been spent if all the products purchased
were transformed into non-organic products while holding the bundle qh constant.
Formally, let zn = fzn
b gb2B be a counterfactual vector of characteristics with zn
b (1) = 0
and zn
b (j) = z0
b (j) for j > 1 and for all b 2 B: The vector zn is the vector of characteristics
in the counterfactual world in which all organic products are transformed into non-organic
products. Holding the hedonic price schedule ￿xed, for all b 2 B and for all g counterfactual
prices are given by pn
b = hg (zn
b ). Let pn = fpn
bsg(b;s)2B￿S is the vector of counterfactual






In this counterfactual, when characteristics are zn and prices are pn; the cost minimising
basket is qn
h:






Note that it is the negative of compensating variation; the amount that exactly compensates
a consumer for a change from (p;z) to (pn;zn):
Since the utility function is not known, we cannot calculate this willingness to pay.
However, revealed preference gives a lower bound,
WTP
n
h = eh ￿ e
n
h ￿ (p ￿ p
n) ￿ qh: (3)
By choosing to purchase qh; the consumer has revealed that they are willing to pay at least
(p ￿ pn) ￿ qh to purchase organic. This follows immediately from cost minimisation since
p
n ￿ qh ￿ e
n
h:
9In words, with counterfactual prices pn; the cost of the original bundle is at least as large
as the new cost minimising basket. In a similar way, we can use our estimates to calculate
bounds on willingness to pay for alternative counterfactual baskets.
We can also compute various upper bounds for willingness to pay by considering coun-
terfactual bundles in which some non-organic products are converted to organic. For exam-
ple, consider the extreme counterfactual bundle in which all products become organic. Let
zo = fzo
bgb2B be the ￿all-organic" counterfactual characteristics vector with zo
b (1) = 1 and
zo
b (j) = zb (j) for j > 1 and for all b 2 B: Let po
b = hg (zo
b) for all b 2 B and for all g: For





o ￿ p) ￿ qh:
This characteristics bundle is the maximally organic bundle; all products are transformed
into organic products.
In summary, for each consumer we can calculate lower and upper bounds on willingness
to pay for organic using
w
n
h = (p ￿ p






o ￿ p) ￿ qh ￿ e
o
h ￿ eh: (5)
For each consumer that purchases any products with the organic characteristic, equation
(4) provides a lower bound on willingness to pay for the bundle of organic items actually
purchased. For each consumer that purchases any non-organic items, equation (5) provides
an upper bound for willingness to pay for organic for all non-organic items purchased.
For a single household, these lower and upper bounds are only comparable under very
restrictive conditions - if all goods are strictly separable in utility and there are no time
varying preference shocks. In this special case, each purchase event (one Cox apple on
Tuesday, one Tesco 2 litre whole milk on Wednesday, one can of beans on Thursday, etc)
provides information on the same willingness to pay for the organic characteristic. It is easy
10to see that the data are not consistent with this special case. If we attempt to impose these
conditions, nearly all households violate the conditions of revealed preference.
More generally, the bounds are not comparable because willingness to pay for each com-
ponent of the organic basket depends on the vector or characteristics purchased and on time
varying preference shocks. The lower bound is a lower bound for willingness to pay for the
organic characteristic for the fraction of the basket that is represented by products with the
organic characteristic, while the upper bound is an upper bound for willingness to pay for
the fraction of the basket that is represented by products that do not have the non-organic
characteristic. To estimate the missing bounds - an upper bound for the organic fraction of
the basket and a lower bound for the non-organic fraction - we would need to add further
assumptions on preference shocks and store switching behaviour or use the panel aspect of
the data to identify willingness to pay.7 What we do in this paper is consider what we can
learn by exploiting revealed preference and equilibrium pricing alone.
In comparisons across households, it is important to note that the price vectors are the
same across households while the baskets vary. Our measured bound on willingness to pay
is the revealed price index for organic characteristics in the consumer food basket. It is a
Laspeyres index. It reveals ￿rst order bounds on WTP, but in common with most price
indices it does not account for potential substitution that might occur if prices did indeed
change.
2.4 Household heterogeneity
The expenditure premia in (4) and (5)are consumer speci￿c. While the prices are the same
for all consumers, the baskets chosen are not. Consumers make di⁄erent purchase choices.
Hence, the expenditure premia vary across consumers.
In our application we consider how our estimated lower bounds vary with demographic
7In ongoing work we are estimating a discrete-continuous demand model that imposes further structure on
utility, exploits the panel nature of the dataset and exploits household level price variation across transactions
induced by random shocks to the store choice process. Exploiting the repeated observations in the panel
data is more complicated than in a simple discrete choice framework, for example, because the dimension of
the vector qht is very large.
11characteristics and in particular with stated preference survey responses to attitudinal ques-




h = (p ￿ p
n) ￿ q (xh;￿h)
where we have written q (xh;￿h) to emphasise that consumer demand depends on observable
consumer characteristics xh and unobservable consumer characteristics ￿h: Without imposing
more structure and/or using the panel nature of the data, we cannot estimate the demand
functions q. In particular, we expect that quantities demanded will depend on prices and
that prices will depend on unobserved heterogeneity. However, we can estimate a reduced
form willingness to pay regression of the form
lnw
n
h = d(xh) + ￿h; (6)
where xh is a vector of consumer characteristics, as described above, and ￿h is a scalar error
term. This regression gives us some idea of how important di⁄erent observed consumer
characteristic are in explaining variation in consumer level lower bounds on willingness to
pay for organic products.
2.5 Comparison to literature
The hedonic and industrial organisation literatures have largely focused on the analysis of
discrete choices over single commodities.8. This work does not typically use information that
is available on the intensive margin of quantity purchased nor information on simultaneous
purchases of multiple discrete commodities with the same characteristic. Methods have been
developed to analyse these cases. Scotchmer (1984), Dubin and McFadden (1984), Hane-
man (1984), Smith (2004), Beckert, Gri¢ th and Nesheim (2009) analyse demand with both
discrete and continuous margins and Hendel (1999) and Dube (2005) analyse multiple dis-
8Examples include: ready to eat cereals (Nevo, 2001), cars (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, 2004),
computers (Bajari and Benkard (2005a, b)), butter and margarine (Gri¢ th, Nesheim, O￿ Connell, 2010),
houses Chay and Greenstone (2005) or jobs Leeth and Ruser (2004).
12crete choices. However, all of these methods remain intractable in cases where the consumer
basket contains a large number (i.e. dozens or hundreds) of products.
In order to study demand for the entire basket it is useful to move back towards classical
demand methods that were developed to analyse demand for a basket of goods. However,
the number of products that can be feasibly studied is limited here as well. Parametric
classical demand methods generally aggregate goods. Similarly, revealed preference methods
have typically aggregated goods up to a small number of commodities.9 Blow, Browning
and Crawford (2008), henceforth BBC, extended classical revealed preference methods to
study willingness to pay for characteristics of goods. However, the number of characteristics
that can feasibly be studied in their set up is small. BBC impose that milk is separable
from other goods and study willingness to pay for organic milk. They state ￿if we drop
separability, then we are left with an impossibly wide problem (hundreds of goods and dozens
of characteristics.)￿ If we want to look at something like the basket of food purchased in
supermarkets the scale of the estimation problem is beyond these methods. Our paper shows
that it is possible to analyse the ￿impossibly wide problem￿if one is willing to study bounds
on willingness to pay. To clarify some of the empirical issues involved, we discuss BBC and
its relationship to our work in more detail.
2.5.1 Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2008)
BBC embed a characteristics model of utility in a classic revealed preference setting, thus
bringing together the classical demand literature with the literature on hedonic or character-
istics models. Their most general theoretical model is indeed very general. It is equivalent
to our model except in two dimensions: it does not allow for time varying demand shocks,
and it abstracts from the process by which prices are set.
In addition, a number of di⁄erences arise in comparing their empirical application with
ours. First, BBC study a single product, milk; we study the entire basket of groceries.
Second, they impose additional structure on the problem in their empirical application by
9For example, see Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003).
13considering only a subset of the relevant product characteristics. They assume that the rel-
evant characteristics for milk are ￿milkiness", three levels of fat, and organic; thus assuming
that there are six types of milk. In Table 3 we show that several other characteristics are
important for describing price variation, including pack size, fascia (store format), packag-
ing, and ￿lter method. Ignoring these other characteristics results in biased estimates of the
willingness to pay for the organic characteristic. Further, when combined with aggregation,
it results in spurious variation in prices across consumers and across time.
BBC start with data that is equivalent to ours (transaction level data) but aggregate milk
purchases within households across time, across pack sizes and across stores to compute unit
prices or ￿unit values" of six types of milk.10 These ￿unit values￿ vary within category
re￿ ecting di⁄erences in the products purchased, as well as di⁄erences in the prices faced
by households (see, inter alia, Lahatte et al (1998), Deaton (1987, 2006)). This aggregation
causes several problems. First, the aggregation can lead to a failure to reject rationality when
it should be rejected. Second, the variation in prices across households and across time is
spurious. In the cross section, all households shopping in the same market face one market
price. If all characteristics are included, there is no variation in prices. Any dispersion in
prices across households is spurious (due to di⁄erent households buying di⁄erent sizes or
shopping at di⁄erent stores). Similarly, over time, at least some of the time series variation
in prices that BBC use results from households switching stores or pack sizes, due to demand
shocks. In our data, most of the time series variation in prices is eliminated after accounting
for variations in choices of store and pack size.
Finally, because they are interested in recovering time invariant preferences of consumers,
BBC assume that there are no demand shocks. Classical revealed preference methods require
this assumption to non-parametrically recover preferences from time series of consumer de-
mands. However, in common with the discrete choice demand literature we believe it is quite
natural to assume that day-to-day purchases are a⁄ected by demand shocks. At the disag-
10BBC use data for Denmark over the period 1999-2000. We use data for the UK over 2004.
14gregate level, it is not possible to explain consumer purchases without allowing for demand
shocks.
We illustrate these points with an example. Consider a consumer for whom we observe
the following four items purchased:
Date Pack size Store Product price
1 March pint Sainsbury Organic skimmed 1.40
6 March half gallon Sainsbury Nonorganic skimmed 4.40
9 March pint Tesco Metro Nonorganic skimmed 1.60
14 March pint Sainsbury Organic skimmed 1.50
BBC assume that there are only six milk products de￿ned by fat content (low, medium
and high fat) and whether or not organic. They then aggregate data to the household-month-
product level, calculating an average unit price for each household and for each product
(across other characteristics). From the information in the table above, BBC would conclude
that:
￿ for this consumer, the unit price of organic skimmed milk is (1.40+1.50)/2 = 1.45 per
pint and the unit price of non-organic skimmed milk is (4.40+1.60)/5 = 1.20 per pint.
￿ this consumer￿ s willingness to pay for organic is 0.25 per unit of organic.
If we had only observed this consumer making the 1 March and 9 March purchases,
BBC would conclude that this consumer failed the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences
(GARP). Because they purchased non-organic milk at a higher price than organic, the in-
formation on this consumer would have been discarded.
How does this compare to what we do? Instead of computing 6 prices at each point in
time, we compute 535 prices.11 In the cross section, we observe little variation in prices that
is not explained by product characteristics. In the panel, we observe some but not much
11There is one price for each combination of characteristics that we observe in the market. The relevant
characteristics include store (7 levels), organic (2 levels), pack size (4 levels), own branded (3 levels), fat
content (3 levels), packaging (4 levels), variety (6 levels) and ￿ltering method (5 levels). Not all possible
combinations are observed. We also control for region within the UK and whether the product is on ticket
price reduction, multi-pack o⁄er, or extra-free promotion.
15variation. In contrast, BBC obtain variation in their measured organic price premium both
across individual consumers and across time. Where does this variation come from? It arises
(in part at least) because the products purchased vary across consumer and across time;
BBC aggregate over products and time. In the example above, the price of milk purchased
on 1 March di⁄ers from that purchased on 6 March not only because it is organic, but also
because of the pack size. It is well known that larger pack sizes are priced more cheaply per
volume.12 Omitting package size, which in this example is correlated with organic, leads to
an over-estimate of the organic price premium.
A ￿nal di⁄erence that is worth pointing out is that BBC do not use information on
households that either never or always buy organic products. In our data 18.8% of households
never buy any products with the organic characteristic (no households buy only organic
products.). If we look just at milk, 85% of households do not buy any organic milk while
0.25% buy only organic milk. In both cases, these are important fractions of the population.
For those who don￿ t buy, we provide upper bounds to willingness to pay. For those who
always buy, we provide lower bounds.
3 Empirical application
To illustrate the approach described above we consider households￿willingness to pay for
the organic characteristic. This is an interesting application in it￿ s own right and allows a
direct comparison to Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008). We start by describing our data.
Then we specify the hedonic function and show an example of how we estimate the organic
price premia for one food category. Finally, we show summary results from similar hedonic
regressions for 75 grocery food categories, and estimate bounds on willingness to pay for
organic derived from an analysis of the basket of grocery products.
12Feenstra and Shapiro (2003), Triplett, (2003), Hendel and Nevo (2006), and Gri¢ th, Leibtag, Leicester
and Nevo (2009).
163.1 Data
Our data come from the TNS/Kantar Worldpanel for calendar year 2004. The data are
representative of the entire UK retail grocery market. Households record purchases of all
items that are brought into the home using hand-held scanners. Prices are recorded from
till receipts collected from the households. We use information on prices, quantities and
characteristics of food items purchased for home consumption by 16,881 households. The
sample contains data on more than 11 million purchases. The characteristics data includes
information on a large number of product characteristics judged to be important by market
researchers, as well as store identity. Demographic information and information on a range
of household attitudes (including attitudes towards health, quality, the environment and
organic) is collected annually by a telephone survey.13 We have sampling weights that allow
us to gross-up to population ￿gures.
Individual food products (de￿ned by a unique bar code) are grouped into categories such
as ￿fresh lamb￿ , ￿tea￿ , ￿olives￿ , etc. We use data on 75 categories where organic is a relevant
characteristic. Total expenditure on these products in our sample of households is £12.8m
(grossed up using sampling weights it is £19.7bn). The 75 food categories are shown in Table
1 along with number of purchases, grossed up and observed expenditure and the share of
organic. On average 2.1% of expenditure is on products that have the organic characteristic.
This varies substantially across categories ranging from 0.4% of ￿Fresh Bacon Rashers" to
28.6% of ￿Chilled Meat and Vegetable Extract."
Table 2 shows organic purchases at the household level. Just under 20% of households
never buy any organic products and over a quarter buy only a very small amount (less than
half of one percent of their total expenditure). However, 37% of households spend more
than 1% of their budget on organic products, and there are a small number of households
(7%) that spend over 5% of their budget on organic products. These numbers illustrate the
tremendous heterogeneity in demand for organic products, and that organic is an important
13See Leicester and Old￿eld (2009) and Gri¢ th and O￿ Connell (2009) for further details on the data.
17expenditure category for a signi￿cant part of the population.
3.2 Hedonic model
For each product category g, we estimate a parsimonious log-linear model with interactions
between the organic characteristic and dummy variables representing the dominant super-
market chains. The model includes a large vector of characteristics z as well as dummy
variables indicating month, special o⁄er, region and store type (store types include Asda,
Marks & Spencer, Safeway, Sainsbury, Tesco, Waitrose and other). These are the main vari-
ables driving variation in prices. Since nearly all elements of z are discrete, and since we
have included a large set of characteristics, these speci￿cations are very ￿ exible and capture
most of the variation in prices.14
Let (b;r;s;t) index items, regions, store types and time. For each product category, we
estimate a hedonic regression of the form
ln(pbrst) = ￿1￿t + ￿2￿bt + ￿3￿r + ￿zbs + "brst (7)
where ￿t is the vector of eleven monthly time dummies, ￿bt is a vector of indicators for
special o⁄ers (ticket price reduction, multi-pack purchase and extra free), and ￿r is a vector
of regional dummies (North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands, West
Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland). The residual
"brst captures unobserved product characteristics that are mean independent of the observed
characteristic.
It has long been recognised that interpretation of the error term in hedonic regressions
plays an important role in hedonic analysis.15 In the literature, three main sources of error
have been considered (See Triplett (2005) for a detailed discussion.). First, the error term
14For each regression, we report the adjusted R2 in Table 4. In principle, we could estimate a non-
parametric hedonic function hg for each product category g: However, the characteristics vector z is high
dimensional. Experimentation with more ￿ exible speci￿cations (for example, Box-Cox and speci￿cation with
further interactions between discrete characteristics) did not result in qualitatively di⁄erent results. Details
are available from the authors on request.
15See, inter alia, Griliches (1961), Epple (1987), Pakes (2003), Triplett (2005), Bajari and Benkard (2005a),
and Erickson and Pakes (2007).
18could come purely from error in measurement of prices. In this case, if the measurement error
is mean independent of the observed characteristics, the estimated hedonic price function
is consistent and counterfactual hedonic prices can be predicted using the hedonic price
function and ignoring the error term.
Second, it could re￿ ect unmeasured product characteristics that are observed by buyers
and sellers and hence that a⁄ect market prices. In this case, if the unmeasured product
characteristics are mean independent of the observed characteristics we can still estimate the
hedonic price function consistently, but we must use care in predicting counterfactual prices.
Counterfactual prices rely on an assumption about what value of unmeasured characteristics
is assumed for the counterfactual goods. Alternative counterfactuals can be generated under
di⁄erent assumptions about the level of unobserved characteristics that is forecast for the
counterfactual good. Transforming a good from organic to non-organic holding everything
else constant requires holding the unobservable constant as well.
Third, the error term in the regression could re￿ ect pricing errors. In this case, the
analysis is similar to that in the unobserved characteristics case. Alternative counterfactuals
can be generated under di⁄erent assumptions about the level of the ￿pricing error￿ for
the counterfactual product. In our analysis, we include the error term in our counterfactual
predictions because we believe that in our data pure measurement error in prices is relatively
minimal while the other two considerations may be more important.
















Di⁄erences in the observed price for the organic characteristic across products, locations
and time re￿ ect the technological feasibility of producing and selling organic products, the
cost structure of ￿rms, the nature of competition in the market, and the distribution of
demand across locations and products. For example, if the cost di⁄erential between organic
19and non-organic beef is larger than that between organic and non-organic chicken, then, all
else equal, the organic price premium on beef will be higher than on chicken. Alternatively,
if demand for organic beef is more price elastic than demand for organic chicken, or entry
into organic beef production is more elastic to pro￿ts, then, all else equal, the organic price
premium on beef will be lower than on chicken. In general, for each product category, each
of these factors plays a role in determining the equilibrium hedonic price of the organic
characteristic.
One potential data issue that has received considerable attention in the revealed prefer-
ence literature is that pbrst is only recorded if item b is purchased in region r at store s at
time t: Otherwise, it is not observed. Let dbrst = 1 indicate that we observe at least one
occurrence of the price. We assume that
E ("brst jzbs;dbrst = 1) = E ("brst jzbs;dbrst = 0) = 0: (9)
That is, we assume that the mean log price of unobserved characteristics is no di⁄erent
amongst items not purchased. In our application, this is a weak assumption for several
reasons. First, the weighted Kantar/TNS sample is nationally representative of both all
households and all expenditure items. By construction, the sample is meant to have the
desired property. Second, the sample is large and high frequency. Regularly purchased items
appear in the sample with high probability. Infrequently purchased items are items for which
a very small fraction of the market has willingness to pay larger than the price. But, this
does not necessarily imply that these products have log prices that are higher than average.
It could be that log prices are lower than average but that willingness to pay is even lower.
In our application, there is no reason to expect that average log prices amongst these items
is systematically di⁄erent from log prices of sampled items. In other applications, this might
not hold. For example, Erickson, Pakes, and Center (2008) ￿nd that a similar assumption
does not hold in monthly data for the television market. In contrast to their study, our data
sample has a much higher frequency (daily), focuses on a very di⁄erent market (groceries),
and is a much larger sample of individual transactions.
203.2.1 Results for a single food category: milk
To clarify our empirical approach, and to aid comparison to Blow, Browning and Crawford
(2008), we present results for milk in Table 3. In the ￿rst column we replicate a speci￿cation
that is close to Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008). We include in the z vector only the
organic and fat content characteristics (interacted), along with common month and region
e⁄ects. The adjusted R2 on this regression is small at 0.065. The interactions between
organic and fat content are not signi￿cant (either individually or jointly) - ￿rms in the UK
do not charge di⁄erential premia on organic depending on the fat content. Therefore in
column 2 we drop these interactions, which changes very little else. In column 3 we add in
the full set of characteristics including package size and type, variety of milk, store fascia in
which purchased and whether on special o⁄er. Many of these are statistically signi￿cant, and
the estimated organic premium declines signi￿cantly. The adjusted R2 increases to 0.726 -
these additional characteristics explain a substantial proportion of the variation in prices.
In the ￿nal column we include interactions between the organic characteristic and the store
fascia in which the milk was purchased. Across all stores, the average price premium for
organic milk is 15% and ranges from 0% at Asda to 13% at Tesco to 30% at Waitrose.
Ignoring multiple purchases and quantity choices for the moment, since the market share of
organic milk is 2.2%, we can say that roughly 2.2% of households have willingness to pay
for organic milk of at least 15% while 97.8% of households are willing to pay no more than
15%. However, those who buy organic milk at Waitrose, reveal a lower bound on willingness
to pay of 30%.
3.2.2 Results for all food categories
We repeat this analysis for each of the 75 food categories in the data by running 75 separate
regressions of the form of (7). Each regression includes a set of characteristics that is common
to all categories (whether the product is organic, whether it is an own-brand product, the
store it was sold in (Asda, M&S, Safeway, Sainsbury￿ s, Tesco, Waitrose and other), package
21size, month and region e⁄ects, and whether the product was sold as part of a multi-purchase
deal, an extra-free o⁄er or on ticket price reduction (sale)) as well as a set of category speci￿c
characteristics. The category speci￿c characteristics vary in number and type. For example,
there are over 200 ￿ avours of soup and over 250 ￿ avours of yoghurt. Eggs, on the other
hand, have relatively few characteristics - whether they are barn reared or free range, eggs
size and whether they are branded.
The organic coe¢ cients and their standard errors along with the adjusted R2￿ s from
the regressions are shown in Table 4. Each row in the table shows results from a separate
regression. There is a great deal of variation in the estimated organic coe¢ cients both across
product categories and across stores. A histogram of all estimated organic price premia is
plotted in Figure 1. Of the 595 potential organic-fascia coe¢ cients we are able to identify
518 (some stores never sell an organic version of some products), 462 are positive and 338
are signi￿cantly so (at the 5% level). The unweighted mean of the price premia is 0.40
(suggesting the organic characteristic increases prices by 40%) and the median is 0.38. For
each of the major supermarket chains, Figure 2 shows the within-store distribution of price
premia across product categories. Asda and Safeway have the smallest mean and median
price premia as well as the most categories (8) with price premia less than or equal to zero.
Even for these stores, most of the premia are positive and range from zero to 125%. The
other stores have higher average and median organic price premia, fewer categories (4 or 5)
with non-positive coe¢ cients. In all cases, the range of positive price premia is from zero to
nearly 125%. Marks & Spencer has the highest mean and median markup, followed closely
by Sainsbury￿ s, Waitrose and Tesco.
The adjusted R2 are high (with a few exceptions) suggesting that we have captured most
of the product characteristics that a⁄ect pricing. However, unobserved factors still play a
role. Bajari and Benkard (2005b) note that a hedonic price index can ignore the pricing
of unobserved characteristics if the relationship between observed and unobserved is stable.
We argue that this is the case in our application. In UK retail grocery markets technical
22change is relatively slow; new and exiting product have small aggregate market shares. We
have detailed information on all product characteristics judged to be important by market
research ￿rms, including characteristics that vary over time (such as being on special o⁄er)
and space (such as being sold in a di⁄erent store). As indicated by the adjusted R2; measured
characteristics explain most of the variation of prices in our data. Because of the stability
of the market, it is quite plausible that the relationship of any unmeasured characteristics
to measured is stable.
The organic price premia, combined with the decision to buy or not, gives us bounds on
willingness to pay for individual organic items. These item speci￿c bounds can be combined
with data on quantities purchased to estimate household speci￿c bounds on willingness to
pay for baskets of organic products.
3.3 Bounds on individual households￿willingness to pay
The lower bound on an individual household￿ s willingness to pay for organic foods is given
by equation (4). For each household, we measure qhbrst as the total quantity of item b
purchased at store s in region r by household h in month t, and pbrst as the price of item b
in store s in region r at time t: The dimension of the vectors p and qh are each over 4 million
(47,854 barcodes by 12 months by 7 stores). Each element of (p ￿ pn) is computed using our
estimated hedonic coe¢ cients and equation (8).
Tables 5 shows the distribution across households of the bound in (4) measured in 2004
pounds sterling.16 Over 20% of households either bought no organic products, or bought only
a small amount whose price premium was below zero, revealing that their willingness to pay
for organic may very well have been zero or negative. The remaining 80% of households were
willing to pay at least some positive amount for products with the organic characteristic.
Around one quarter have a lower bound less than a pound a year, while over half were
16For households that are not observed throughout the entire year, we gross the lower bound up to the level
of a full year using weights that represent the average share of expenditure in each month. For example, if we
observe the household from January to October, then we divide the estimated lower bound by the average
share of total annual expenditure that is accounted for by those months.
23willing to pay more than £1 a year. Around 10% were willing to pay £10 or more and 123
households were willing to pay more than £100 a year. Table 6 expresses these numbers
as a share of households￿annual expenditure on organic foods. These are household level
weighted average organic price premia. We see that almost half of households are willing to
pay 20% or more for the organic characteristic on these products.
We also compute estimates of the upper bound on household￿ s willingness to pay for
organic based on equation (5). Table 7 shows the distribution of these as a share of total
expenditure on non-organic items. Most households would not pay more than 40%, and a
substantial proportion would not pay more than 30%, on these items.
As we noted at the end of section 2.3, the willingness to pay varies across households
because di⁄erent households buy di⁄erent baskets. Di⁄erent baskets may have di⁄erent
organic contents (e.g. households may buy di⁄erent organic items or the fraction of items
that are organic may di⁄er). The measure we obtain is the total price premium paid for all
organic characteristics purchased in the entire food basket.17
It is worth emphasising that without making further assumptions our lower bound and
our upper bound are not strictly comparable, because they are literally bounds on willingness
to pay for organic apples and oranges. However, they are comparable under two conditions.
First, suppose indirect utility is separable and takes the form
v (xh;g1 (z1;p1);:::;gB (zB;pB)):
where (zb;pb) is the price and characteristics vector for item b: Then, for each good, the trade-
o⁄ between characteristics and price is independent of all other goods. Second, suppose the
functions gb are identical for all b: Then the trade-o⁄ is the same for all b. Under these two
conditions, household xh will have a unique willingness to pay for organic - a willingness to
pay that is the same for all goods. Under these conditions, every organic purchase decision
is independent and identical; there is a single threshold. Unfortunately, these assumptions
17Comparing across baskets is analogous to comparing across jobs when calculating the wage premium for
all job related risks in the value of statistical life literature (e.g. Viscusi and Aldy (2003)).
24are unlikely to hold. Many of the food products we study are either close substitutes or
complements. Additionally, the fact that the price premia vary across products rejects the
second condition.
3.4 Analysis
In this section we discuss two examples that illustrate how these bounds are informative. We
￿rst study how the lower bound on willingness to pay varies with household characteristics,
beliefs and attitudes, and discuss how this illuminates the reasons that the organic charac-
teristic is valued. Secondly, we evaluate what our bounds can tell us about the potential
revenue that a store could earn from introducing a new organic product line.
3.4.1 Reasons for heterogeneity in willingness to pay
Why are households willing to pay for organic food? We combine the estimates presented
above with demographic information and survey response data on attitudes towards health,
the environment and product quality as described in section 2.4 to shed light on this question.
We consider how our estimated lower bound on willingness to pay for organic foods varies
with self-reported preferences and beliefs and a number of demographic characteristics. We
exploit qualitative survey data that are collected by TNS and consider three main factors
that have been highlighted in the literature as being reasons why people value organic, and
on which we have data - bene￿ts to the environment, health bene￿ts, and better quality
food.
In the survey households are asked to indicate the degree to which they agree with each
of the following statements:
1. Organic products are healthier
2. I try to buy a healthy range of foods these days
3. Organic foods are friendlier to the environment
254. I try to buy environmentally friendly products
5. Organic foods are better quality
6. I don￿ t mind paying for quality
For each statement, respondents are asked to choose one response from the list
fAgree strongly, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagreeg:
We treat these responses as qualitative measures of household preferences and beliefs and
investigate the statistical relationships between the responses and the lower bounds to house-
hold willingness to pay. For each of the three factors (environment, health, quality), we have
one response that provides a qualitative measure of beliefs and a second that provides a
qualitative measure of preferences.
We ￿rst report cross-tabulations of responses to these survey questions, household organic
expenditure shares and the lower bounds on willingness to pay for organic. In order to reduce
the dimensionality of our tables, we report results that pool the ￿ve possible survey responses
into two groups, (Agree strongly, Agree) and (Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly
disagree). Tables 8-10 show these cross-tabulations.
Table 8 shows that 2178 households say both that they try to buy healthy foods and that
they think organic products are healthier. For these households organic products make up
4.7% of total expenditure, and these households have a mean lower bound on their willingness
to pay that represents 2.2% of their total food expenditure. Agreement with both statements
is correlated with high expenditure shares and with high lower bounds on willingness to pay.
In contrast, 6649 households do not particularly try to buy healthy foods and do not think
organic foods are healthier. Disagreement with both statements is negatively correlated with
organic expenditure shares and with the lower bound; organic products make up 1.3% of
total expenditure in this group and their estimated lower bound on willingness to pay for
organic is 0.3% of total expenditure on food. Tables 9 and 10 display similar ￿gures for
26the questions related to the environment and quality. A total of 1941 households both feel
that organic products are good for the environment and try to buy environmentally friendly
products. These households spend 3.7% of their budget on organic foods and are willing
to pay at least 0.9% of total expenditure. A smaller number of households, 1334, believe
organic products are higher quality and do not mind paying for quality; these households
spend a larger share (5.9%) on organic products and have a higher estimated lower bound on
willingness to pay of 1.4% of total food expenditure. These tables show that preferences and
beliefs related to health, the environment and quality are correlated with organic expenditure
shares and with bounds on willingness to pay.
Next we seek to disentangle the relative importance of these beliefs and preferences
through a multivariate analysis. We regress the households￿lower bounds on willingness to
pay on the attitudinal responses discussed above and a range of other household character-
istics including: family structure, total annual expenditure on food and non-food items (as
a proxy for income), the household￿ s social class, and whether anyone in the household is a
vegetarian. The means of these variables are shown in Table 12 (most are discrete variables).
Table 11 reports results from this analysis. The column (1) results are from a model that
includes only four dummies, one for agreement with both health statements, one for agree-
ment with both environment statements, one for agreement with both quality statements,
and one indicating that the household￿ s responses to these questions were missing. (i.e. the
dummies indicate whether the household is in the upper left-hand quadrant of Tables 8, 9
or 10 respectively). Households that care a lot about organic and health have on average a
lower bound on willingness to pay that is £5.78 higher than households that do not (i.e. are
in any of the other three quadrants of Table 8). Households that care a lot about organic
and the environment have a lower bound that is £1.73 higher and those that care about
quality have a lower bound that is £8.71 higher. Responses to each of the attitude questions
are positively correlated with both organic market shares and lower bounds on willingness to
pay for organic. The average lower bound is highest amongst the group for whom quality is
27important, next highest amongst the ￿health is important" group, and next highest amongst
the "environment is important" group.
Column (2) reports results from a model that adds indicators of households that are in
the upper right and lower left quadrants of Tables 8-10. These additional indicators have
little e⁄ect. Column (3) adds demographic controls. The parameter estimates don￿ t change
much and the R2 increases. Columns (4)-(6) display results from separate regressions for
each of the main social classes. There is considerable variation in parameter estimates across
the groups. Professional households who care a lot about health have a lower bound on
willingness to pay that is nearly twice as high as skilled and unskilled households who care
a lot about health (£7.68 versus £4.64 and £3.91). Professional and skilled households who
value quality have a lower bound that is nearly twice as high as unskilled households (£8.24
and 9.13 versus £4.96). In contrast, valuation of the environment is similar across the social
classes. The estimates in Table 11 allow us to calculate the contribution to willingness to pay
lower bounds of each of the three concerns - health, environment and quality. In all cases
we see that valuing quality is the characteristic that is associated with households that have
the highest lower bound on their willingness to pay, followed by health with environment
contributing the least.
If we want to know the aggregate lower bound on the valuation of these three concerns
then we need to consider not only the mean lower bound on the valuation for those who have
the preferences and attitudes that the particular issue is important, but also the number of
households that fall into that group. Combining those two pieces of information we get
estimates that suggest that the total lower bound on willingness to pay for health is around
£16.9m, for the environment around £5.4m, and for quality around £17.8m. These results
are interesting and may be surprising to some people. Quality and health seem to be much
more important factors in determining the amount (or at least the lower bound) households
are willing to pay for organic products. This has implications for the regulation of organic
labelling, and for the way that ￿rms may want to advertise organic products.
283.4.2 Introduction of a new organic product line
The upper bound on willingness to pay is also informative. Suppose a ￿rm were considering
whether to convert some set of products to organic. What would be the potential impact?
Our results allow us to estimate an upper bound on the potential revenue implications of such
a move without imposing strong assumptions. This bound is the ￿rm speci￿c component of
our previously computed upper bounds. To illustrate, we compute upper bounds on revenue
gains from converting two speci￿c food categories to organic - eggs and vegetables. In a
similar way, we could calculate results for any other food category.
In considering such a strategy, three factors drive di⁄erences in projected revenue across
stores - the baseline expenditure on the category in each store, the current proportion that
is organic, and the price premium on organic. We can easily calculate the ￿rst two from our
data (and they are ￿gures that a store would readily know). To get the third we need to
have the hedonic regressions.
Table 13 displays the results. For each store and each product category, columns (2) to
(4) show the estimated price premia, expenditure, and the share organic. Column (5) shows
our estimate of expenditure if products in the category were converted to organic (assuming
no substitution by consumers and no price changes by the ￿rms). Column (6) presents the
estimated upper bound on the % increase in revenue from switching all the products in the
store to organic.
We ￿nd signi￿cant variation in the price premia charged by di⁄erent stores. For eggs,
the premia range from 26% to over 49%. Similarly, the organic share of the eggs category
varies substantially from 4% in Asda to nearly 20% in M&S. There is also a large variance
in the total expenditure on eggs. Putting these together, the upper bounds on the revenue
increase from converting all eggs to organic range from about 28% for Asda to a maximum
of just over 54% for Sainsbury.
Looking at vegetables (salad and other) loose we see an even wider variance in the price
premia on organic across fascia - ranging from 15% to 57%. The organic share ranges from
291% to over 15%. The projected maximum revenue gain from converting all vegetables (salad
and other) loose to organic ranges from 15% to over 70% increase.
When considering product line changes, a supermarket could compare these maximum
revenue projections to expected costs and begin to make ￿rst-order judgements as to which
changes might be pro￿table. These could be used to rule out unpro￿table changes and allow
the supermarkets to focus more detailed analysis on categories that are potentially pro￿table.
While these estimates do not provide point estimates on revenues or pro￿ts, they require very
few assumptions about household preferences or behaviour and so are quite robust. They
are upper bounds. In particular they ignore substitution e⁄ects and competitor responses.
Further work would then be needed to estimate more precise consumer substitution responses
and to gauge rivals responses.
4 Summary and conclusions
Rich data on spending behaviour are now widely available in a number of countries. These
data o⁄er great potential to learn about willingness to pay for many di⁄erent characteristics.
However, their use has been in part thwarted by the sheer scale of the data. Existing
revealed preference approaches to estimating willingness to pay can not deal with the large
dimensionality of these data.
Methods such as Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2008) illustrate how assumptions about
separability and no time varying demand shocks, combined with panel data, can be used to
obtain point estimates of willingness to pay, at least for a fraction of the population. We
extend the ideas developed in Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2008) by incorporating market
pricing equilibrium conditions, which help to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, but
allow us to retain much of the ￿ exibility of their approach. We use standard assumptions
about market pricing equilibrium and consumer revealed preference behaviour to compute
consumer speci￿c bounds on willingness to pay. We show how to aggregate estimates of
willingness to pay for individual products across a basket of products in a manner that
30is consistent with consumer theory. These bounds are Laspeyres style price indexes for
di⁄erentiated products. In order to recover point estimates of the willingness to pay we
would need to make further assumptions about the structure of consumers￿preferences.
While this is certainly feasible for individual product categories, further work needs to be
done to develop a tractable method to analyse the entire food basket.
We illustrate the application of these methods using rich data on households￿purchases of
food to estimate lower and upper bounds on willingness to pay for the organic characteristic
in food. Our results suggest that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in willingness to
pay for organic products. We relate these revealed bounds on willing to pay for organic to
households￿stated preferences over organic products to learn about why households value
the organic characteristics. Somewhat surprisingly, quality is the most important reason,
health concerns coming second, and environmental concerns lagging far behind. We have
also shown how these methods can be applied to calculate an upper bound on the revenue
impact to a supermarket of introducing a new product range. These are both applications
that have direct practical relevance.
In future work it would be interesting to investigate the panel dimension of our data in
order to obtain more precise estimates of structural demand parameters. This will require
further assumptions about store choice and of the dynamics of consumer preference shocks.
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Bread  642,298 761.8  501,195.50  1.9% 
Biscuits  681,589 934.1  620,856.80  1.5% 
Canned Goods 
Ambient Soup  145,824  155.7  101,279.60  1.3% 
Baked Beans  160,385  151.1  103,654.40  0.7% 
Canned Fruit  96,504  102.8  65,043.86  1.0% 
Canned Milk Puddings  23,499  21.9  14,241.06  1.1% 
Prepared Peas And Beans (M)  108,480  58.7  38,745.33  1.9% 
Tomato Products  15,646  82.6  54,607.53  1.8% 
Chilled Convenience 
Chilled Meat and Veg Extract   803  2.2  1,238.67  28.6% 
Chilled Vegetarian Products  6,291  27.1  17,760.19  4.1% 
Fresh Soup  708  2.2  1,278.55  11.7% 
Other Chilled Convenience  26,504  73.2  49,201.10  0.6% 
Chilled Drinks 
Chill One Shot Drinks (excl Flavoured Milk)  7,818  16.7  10,198.06  1.0% 
Chilled Fruit Juices  90,977  215.9  134,044.50  5.1% 
Dairy Products 
Butter 110,590  223.1  140,477.50  1.7% 
Cream 97,275  124.9  77,871.22  1.4% 
Hens Eggs  195,032  322.1  207,443.00  5.8% 
Desserts Long Life   18,992  22.9  16,063.18  2.2% 
Cheese (excl Formage Frais), pre-packaged  313,840  687.6  454,997.00  0.6% 
Cheese (excl Formage Frais), loose  199,531  547.0  354,582.90  1.4% 
Milk 745,006  1460.8  952,108.50  2.2% 
Yoghurt 384,261  581.7  373,848.80  5.7% 
Chilled/Prepared Fruit and Veg  150,201 284.6  178,726.10  1.5% 
Frozen Prepared Foods 
Frozen Vegetables  95,256  160.5  107,926.80  2.6% 
Ice Cream  74,719  195.3  125,001.00  1.3% 
Fruit & Vegetables 
Fruit, pre-packaged  112,701  323.3  196,801.60  1.1% 
Fruit, loose  1,003,804  1681.9  1,057,302.00  2.5% 
Vegetables (brassicas, legumes, root), pre-packaged  240,272  459.1  301,242.10  2.6% 
Vegetables (brassicas, legumes, root), loose  369,969  438.3  275,008.20  2.2% 
Vegetables (brassicas, legumes, root), other  436,134  364.2  232,421.90  5.1% 
Vegetables (salad and other), loose  814,249  941.9  588,532.40  2.7% 
Vegetables (salad and other), pre-packaged  16,615  28.7  17,886.60  0.7% 
Hot Beverages 
Food Drinks  43,780  93.9  59,194.17  1.6% 
Fruit And Herbal Teas, pre-packaged  10,784  18.9  11,463.78  3.4% 
Fruit And Herbal Teas, loose  2,787  4.9  3,192.41  6.4% 38 
 










Instant Coffee  94,000  380.2  243,416.40  1.4% 
Coffee (Beans, Ground or Liquid)  16,020  65.3  37,546.37  12.5% 
Tea 103,048  290.4  188,799.80  1.4% 
Meat 
Fresh Bacon Rashers  153,469  516.8  337,446.00  0.4% 
Fresh Beef/Veal  180,752  843.0  552,037.10  1.1% 
Fresh Lamb  36,127  244.9  155,213.50  2.0% 
Fresh Pork  83,703  383.0  250,903.50  0.7% 
Fresh Sausages  95,486  221.4  147,070.00  0.8% 
Packet & Other Foods 
Breakfast Cereals, pre-packaged  303,306  760.5  505,664.40  1.4% 
Breakfast Cereals, loose  43,461  93.7  62,915.65  1.8% 
Cous Cous  6,390  8.1  5,188.06  4.6% 
Dry Meat Substitutes  1,232  2.0  1,352.80  8.1% 
Dry Pasta  82,424  79.1  52,887.59  2.5% 
Flour 46,616  47.2  29,392.26  4.8% 
Home Baking   77,243  147.8  91,268.00  2.1% 
Honey 11,382  36.2  21,843.02  4.4% 
Lemon And Lime Juices  6,981  7.1  4,303.94  1.2% 
Peanut Butter  11,980  19.5  12,690.15  1.4% 
Preserves 71,325  98.6  61,326.38  3.0% 
Sugar 116,556  163.9  107,187.90  0.5% 
Syrup And Treacle  6,071  8.4  5,364.67  3.4% 
Vinegar 18,928  20.2  12,595.02  3.6% 
Condiments 
Ambient Condiments   7,335  9.8  6,337.51  3.0% 
Ambient Salad Accompaniments  26,348  39.5  25,285.99  1.8% 
Pickles 31,026  42.7  27,267.50  0.6% 
Sauces And Ketchup (Exc:Wrcster)  71,970  105.5  72,759.39  1.6% 
Fresh Poultry  63,472 370.8  242,645.70  2.1% 
Savouries 
Nuts 60,107  122.1  76,189.25  1.2% 
Savoury Snacks And Reconstitutes  200,674  321.3  227,365.20  2.1% 
Ambient Savoury Snacks  123,438  163.9  111,628.90  0.6% 
Savoury Home Cooking 
Ambient Cooking Scauces excl Condiments  227,456  375.4  251,363.50  1.7% 
Ambient Meat+Veg Extracts  98,116  147.6  98,092.15  1.3% 
Cooking Oils  53,188  119.3  77,575.33  1.7% 
Soft Drinks 
Bottled Non-Lemonade (flavoured)  130,436  213.8  146,018.10  6.1% 
Canned Lemonade  479  0.7  502.07  21.5% 
Canned Non-Lemonade (flavoured)  29,837  77.8  52,673.88  1.0% 39 
 










Ambient Flavoured Milk  10,328  17.2  11,836.07  6.9% 
Ambient Fruit Juices  173,282  294.5  189,479.30  1.5% 
Ambient One Shot Drinks  80,601  159.5  114,693.10  1.2% 
Chocolate and Sugar Confectionary  540,699 1130.6  740,970.10  2.4% 
Total  11,100,000 19721.3  12,800,000.00  2.1% 
Note: Data include 16,881 households over calendar year 2004. A purchase is a household-store-day 
transaction (if a household buys two of the exact same product in one day at the same store this is one 
transaction, if they buy the same product at a different store or a different product at the same store that 
counts as a separate transaction). Grossed-up expenditure is sampled expenditure weighted by household 




Table 2:  Share of household expenditure on products with organic characteristic 
Share of household expenditure on 
organic products  
Number of 
households
% of households  Cumulative % of 
households
0 3,177 18.82  18.82
less than 0.25%  2,168 12.84  31.66
0.25% - 0.5%  2,279 13.50  45.16
0.5% - 1%  3,007 17.81  62.98
1% - 5%  4,985 29.53  92.51
5% - 10%  757 4.48  96.99
over 10%  508 3.01  100.00
Total  16,881 100.00 
Note: Data include 16,881 households over calendar year 2004.  40 
 
Table 3: Hedonic regressions for milk 
Dependent variable: 
ln(price)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
organic  0.296*** 0.256*** 0.150*** 0.166*** 





organic*Asda  -0.170* 
[0.0919] 
organic*M&S  0.061 
[0.0385] 
organic*Safeway  0.0302 
[0.0354] 
organic*Sainsbury  0.0298 
[0.0369] 
organic*Tesco  -0.0343 
[0.0349] 
organic*Waitrose  0.136*** 
[0.0506] 
fat: semi-skimmed  -0.0542  -0.0564  0.00278  0.00279 
[0.0476] [0.0464]  [0.00541]  [0.00538] 
fat: skimmed  -0.145**  -0.147**  -0.0232**  -0.0234** 
[0.0616] [0.0602]  [0.00962]  [0.00957] 
size (1.136 litre, 2 pints)  -0.0714***  -0.0717*** 
[0.00942] [0.00943] 
size (1.14-2.272 litres, inc. 4 
pints)     -0.191*** -0.191*** 
[0.0100] [0.0100] 
size (3 litres and above)  -0.215***  -0.216*** 
[0.0104] [0.0104] 
brand: budget private label  -0.395***  -0.393*** 
[0.0598] [0.0598] 
brand: standard private label  -0.0823***  -0.0802*** 
[0.0194] [0.0192] 
container: carton  -0.231***  -0.235*** 
[0.0459] [0.0473] 
container: other  -0.314***  -0.314*** 
[0.0493] [0.0493] 
container: plastic  -0.290***  -0.292*** 
[0.0203] [0.0201] 
type: Channel  Island  -0.527***  -0.531*** 
[0.163] [0.165] 
type: Ordinary  -0.940***  -0.946*** 
[0.156] [0.158] 41 
 
Table 3: Hedonic regressions for milk 
Dependent variable: 
ln(price)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
type: other non-cows  -0.289***  -0.289*** 
[0.0979] [0.0999] 
type: Soya  -0.612***  -0.609*** 
[0.170] [0.171] 
type: other  -0.389**  -0.394** 
[0.152] [0.154] 
treatment: pasteurised  -0.136***  -0.138*** 
[0.0198] [0.0196] 
treatment: sterilised  -0.170***  -0.170*** 
[0.0407] [0.0403] 
treatment: U.H.T.  -0.316***  -0.315*** 
[0.0441] [0.0450] 
treatment: other types  -0.142  -0.145 
[0.121] [0.122] 
Asda -0.0192**  -0.0165* 
[0.00929] [0.00928] 
MandS 0.0586***  0.0541*** 
[0.00980] [0.00966] 
Safeway 0.00654  0.0048 
[0.00836] [0.00841] 
Sainsbury -0.00547  -0.00786 
[0.0102] [0.0104] 
Tesco -0.0155  -0.0155 
[0.00954] [0.00942] 
Waitrose 0.00768  -0.0103 
[0.0157] [0.0120] 
ticket price reducation  -0.0611***  -0.0631*** 
[0.0195] [0.0196] 
multi-purchase -0.392***  -0.391*** 
[0.0235] [0.0233] 
extra free  -0.0105  -0.00915 
[0.0680] [0.0675] 
Constant -0.646***  -0.644***  0.851***  0.858*** 
[0.0336] [0.0330]  [0.157]  [0.159] 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.065 0.065 0.726 0.728 
Note: Regression include 745,006 observations on16,881 households purchases of milk over calendar year 2004; all 
regressions include month and region effects. Standard errors in [] are clustered at the barcode level and allow for 
general correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The omitted characteristics are other stores, full-fat,1 pint or 




Table 4: Organic coefficients 
Product category 
organic  organic*Asda  organic*Sainsbur
y  organic*Tesco  organic*Waitrose  adjuste
d R
2  N 
Bread  0.177  (0.031)  -0.060  (0.059)  0.056  (0.086)  0.043  (0.053)  -0.068  (0.106)  0.818 642,298 
Biscuits  -0.180  (0.160)  0.147  (0.201)  0.455  (0.171)  0.315  (0.199)  0.331  (0.168)  0.730 681,589 
Canned Goods 
Ambient Soup  0.119  (0.082)  -0.112  (0.079)  0.368  (0.170)  0.023  (0.034)  -0.258  (0.075)  0.755 145,824 
Baked Beans  0.519  (0.126)  -0.192  (0.127)  -0.034  (0.176)  -0.233  (0.129)  -0.191  (0.272)  0.943 160,385 
Canned Fruit  0.561  (0.176)  -0.198  (0.180)  0.077  (0.111)  0.625 96,504 
Canned Milk Puddings  0.327  (0.060)  -0.192  (0.082)  -0.155  (0.113)  0.768 23,499 
Prepared Peas And Beans   0.531  (0.093)  0.059  (0.121)  0.073  (0.125)  -0.006  (0.095)  -0.070  (0.119)  0.766 108,480 
Tomato Products  0.293  (0.370)  0.000  (0.000)  -0.018  (0.392)  0.000  (0.000)  0.622  (0.375)  0.692 15,646 
Chilled Convenience 
Chilled Meat and Veg Extract   1.249  (0.144)  -0.611  (0.091)  -0.166  (0.111)  0.788 803 
Chilled Vegetarian Products  0.000  (0.000)  0.000  (0.000)  0.000  (0.000)  0.000  (0.000)  0.852 6,291 
Fresh Soup  0.162  (0.137)  0.113  (0.034)  0.742 708 
Other Chilled Convenience  -1.047  (0.505)  0.001  (0.045)  -0.118  (0.083)  0.799 26,504 
Chilled Drinks 
Chill One Shot Drinks (excl Flavoured Milk)  1.038  (0.097)  0.870 7,818 
Chilled Fruit Juices  0.184  (0.171)  0.052  (0.187)  0.115  (0.213)  0.084  (0.181)  0.027  (0.199)  0.710 90,977 
Dairy Products 
Butter 0.314  (0.069)  -0.054  (0.082)  -0.046  (0.080)  -0.291  (0.094)  -0.069  (0.063)  0.723 110,590 
Cream -0.070  (0.073)  -0.157  (0.051)  0.035  (0.022)  -0.070  (0.083)  0.077  (0.048)  0.794 97,275 
Hens Eggs  0.310  (0.054)  -0.051  (0.057)  0.183  (0.063)  0.133  (0.064)  0.130  (0.095)  0.781 195,032 
Desserts Long Life   -0.038  (0.024)  0.046  (0.027)  0.029  (0.042)  -0.024  (0.029)  0.496 18,992 
Cheese (excl Formage Frais), pre-packaged  0.015  (0.089)  0.291  (0.142)  0.167  (0.128)  0.216  (0.147)  0.148  (0.111)  0.765 313,840 
Cheese (excl Formage Frais), loose  0.340  (0.077)  -0.191  (0.096)  -0.058  (0.086)  -0.136  (0.098)  -0.259  (0.110)  0.627 199,531 
Milk 0.167  (0.039)  -0.169  (0.093)  0.030  (0.037)  -0.038  (0.035)  0.134  (0.051)  0.727 745,006 
Yoghurt 0.212  (0.042)  -0.013  (0.064)  -0.057  (0.032)  -0.010  (0.026)  -0.184  (0.035)  0.680 384,261 43 
 
Table 4: Organic coefficients 
Product category 
organic  organic*Asda  organic*Sainsbur
y  organic*Tesco  organic*Waitrose  adjuste
d R
2  N 
Chilled/Prepared Fruit and Veg  -0.003  (0.070)  0.404  (0.104)  0.362  (0.181)  0.208  (0.213)  0.719 150,201 
Frozen Prepared Foods 
Frozen Vegetables  0.176  (0.067)  0.054  (0.068)  0.165  (0.076)  -0.141  (0.096)  0.644 95,256 
Ice Cream  0.045  (0.067)  0.320  (0.091)  0.287  (0.087)  0.068  (0.111)  0.874 74,719 
Fruit & Vegetables 
Fruit, pre-packaged  0.165  (0.150)  0.111  (0.170)  0.067  (0.224)  -0.014  (0.198)  -0.106  (0.196)  0.859 112,701 
Fruit, loose  0.174  (0.145)  -0.022  (0.167)  0.351  (0.153)  0.066  (0.163)  0.113  (0.178)  0.781 1,003,804 
Vegetables (brassicas, legumes, potatoes, root 
crops), pre-packaged  0.101  (0.091)  -0.186  (0.114)  0.215  (0.132)  0.030  (0.128)  0.035  (0.162)  0.653 240,272 
Vegetables (brassicas, legumes, potatoes, root 
crops), loose  0.216  (0.103)  0.286  (0.151)  0.115  (0.110)  0.205  (0.126)  0.069  (0.137)  0.806 369,969 
Vegetables (brassicas, legumes, potatoes, root 
crops), other  0.536  (0.091)  -0.078  (0.114)  -0.152  (0.114)  -0.087  (0.104)  0.033  (0.117)  0.753 436,134 
Vegetables (salad and other), loose  0.461  (0.073)  -0.056  (0.107)  0.109  (0.106)  -0.004  (0.088)  -0.023  (0.108)  0.742 814,249 
Vegetables (salad and other), pre-packaged  -0.542  (0.601)  0.737  (0.643)  0.920 16,615 
Hot Beverages 
Food Drinks  0.625  (0.057)  -0.017  (0.040)  0.024  (0.081)  -0.094  (0.067)  0.876 43,780 
Fruit And Herbal Teas, pre-packaged  0.427  (0.094)  -0.048  (0.065)  -0.393  (0.122)  0.654 10,784 
Fruit And Herbal Teas, loose  0.148  (0.071)  -0.063  (0.060)  -0.069  (0.078)  0.841 2,787 
Instant Coffee  0.397  (0.086)  -0.090  (0.080)  -0.167  (0.045)  -0.130  (0.055)  0.040  (0.051)  0.731 94,000 
Coffee (Beans, Ground or Liquid)  0.083  (0.132)  -0.157  (0.141)  -0.078  (0.130)  -0.050  (0.150)  -0.192  (0.122)  0.710 16,020 
Tea 0.486  (0.087)  -0.292  (0.128)  -0.107  (0.074)  -0.067  (0.124)  -0.388  (0.084)  0.864 103,048 
Meat 
Fresh Bacon Rashers  0.696  (0.245)  -0.646  (0.244)  -0.021  (0.260)  -0.273  (0.248)  -0.045  (0.240)  0.590 153,469 
Fresh Beef/Veal  0.378  (0.082)  -0.052  (0.097)  0.140  (0.122)  0.114  (0.182)  -0.086  (0.121)  0.742 180,752 
Fresh Lamb  0.144  (0.084)  -0.059  (0.099)  0.132  (0.101)  0.048  (0.092)  0.034  (0.156)  0.601 36,127 
Fresh Pork  0.210  (0.178)  0.022  (0.188)  0.420  (0.202)  0.297  (0.184)  0.424  (0.201)  0.560 83,703 
Fresh Sausages  0.400  (0.093)  0.052  (0.107)  0.255  (0.088)  0.010  (0.117)  0.767 95,486 
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Table 4: Organic coefficients 
Product category 
organic  organic*Asda  organic*Sainsbur
y  organic*Tesco  organic*Waitrose  adjuste
d R
2  N 
Breakfast Cereals, pre-packaged  0.112  (0.067)  -0.084  (0.067)  0.102  (0.064)  0.172  (0.065)  0.116  (0.071)  0.851 303,306 
Breakfast Cereals, loose  0.307  (0.044)  0.066  (0.048)  0.060  (0.048)  0.048  (0.045)  0.003  (0.026)  0.860 43,461 
Cous Cous  0.171  (0.083)  0.083  (0.049)  0.103  (0.054)  0.937 6,390 
Dry Meat Substitutes  0.249  (0.080)  0.177  (0.073)  0.776 1,232 
Dry Pasta  0.219  (0.132)  -0.244  (0.229)  0.191  (0.164)  0.148  (0.096)  0.511  (0.171)  0.811 82,424 
Flour 0.052  (0.095)  -0.193  (0.105)  -0.128  (0.059)  0.013  (0.102)  0.346  (0.127)  0.904 46,616 
Home Baking   0.226  (0.115)  -0.086  (0.163)  -0.231  (0.130)  -0.071  (0.132)  -0.033  (0.167)  0.763 77,243 
Honey 0.192  (0.052)  -0.035  (0.039)  0.038  (0.065)  0.173  (0.064)  -0.068  (0.051)  0.648 11,382 
Lemon And Lime Juices  0.579  (0.058)  -0.137  (0.061)  0.875 6,981 
Peanut Butter  0.450  (0.058)  0.193  (0.069)  0.798 11,980 
Preserves 0.182  (0.097)  0.132  (0.101)  0.286  (0.108)  0.001  (0.090)  0.297  (0.120)  0.812 71,325 
Sugar 0.455  (0.143)  -0.213  (0.068)  -0.277  (0.119)  -0.013  (0.057)  -0.098  (0.061)  0.813 116,556 
Syrup And Treacle  1.143  (0.077)  0.287  (0.091)  0.703 6,071 
Vinegar 0.274  (0.220)  -0.165  (0.182)  -0.146  (0.117)  -0.235  (0.130)  0.852 18,928 
Condiments 
Ambient Condiments   0.609  (0.153)  -0.010  (0.043)  0.047  (0.029)  0.485 7,335 
Ambient Salad Accompaniments  0.852  (0.084)  -0.028  (0.089)  0.013  (0.127)  -0.020  (0.084)  0.899 26,348 
Pickles 0.440  (0.110)  -0.195  (0.083)  0.861 31,026 
Sauces And Ketchup (Exc:Wrcster)  0.101  (0.082)  0.059  (0.039)  0.067  (0.093)  0.073  (0.037)  0.248  (0.155)  0.840 71,970 
Fresh Poultry  0.492  (0.096)  0.187  (0.147)  0.062  (0.143)  0.309  (0.214)  -0.533  (0.184)  0.562 63,472 
Savouries 
Nuts 0.436  (0.130)  -0.200  (0.207)  -0.047  (0.201)  -0.010  (0.194)  0.460 60,107 
Savoury Snacks And Reconstitutes  0.133  (0.164)  0.140  (0.143)  0.192  (0.158)  0.164  (0.146)  0.113  (0.142)  0.664 200,674 
Ambient Savoury Snacks  -0.181  (0.106)  0.200  (0.100)  0.343  (0.093)  0.141  (0.222)  0.290  (0.121)  0.833 123,438 
Savoury Home Cooking 
Ambient Cooking Scauces excl Condiments  0.139  (0.061)  -0.192  (0.054)  0.047  (0.058)  -0.028  (0.065)  -0.017  (0.065)  0.876 227,456 
Ambient Meat+Veg Extracts  0.381  (0.143)  -0.235  (0.082)  0.056  (0.086)  -0.236  (0.070)  0.058  (0.099)  0.723 98,116 
Cooking Oils  0.072  (0.188)  0.276  (0.152)  0.358  (0.190)  0.537  (0.283)  0.307  (0.231)  0.853 53,188 45 
 
Table 4: Organic coefficients 
Product category 
organic  organic*Asda  organic*Sainsbur
y  organic*Tesco  organic*Waitrose  adjuste
d R
2  N 
Soft Drinks 
Bottled Non-Lemonade (flavoured)  0.810  (0.189)  0.047  (0.085)  -0.139  (0.063)  -0.101  (0.041)  -0.305  (0.068)  0.867 130,436 
Canned Lemonade  0.631  (0.223)  -0.303  (0.207)  0.953 479 
Canned Non-Lemonade (flavoured)  -0.074  (0.131)  0.521  (0.144)  -0.414  (0.132)  0.783 29,837 
Ambient Flavoured Milk  0.062  (0.162)  0.130  (0.105)  -0.106  (0.106)  -0.017  (0.160)  0.761 10,328 
Ambient Fruit Juices  0.415  (0.074)  -0.093  (0.063)  0.038  (0.071)  0.009  (0.059)  0.117  (0.081)  0.784 173,282 
Ambient One Shot Drinks  0.311  (0.073)  0.250  (0.085)  0.025  (0.080)  0.114  (0.082)  0.666 80,601 
Chocolate and Sugar Confectionary  0.276  (0.054)  -0.201  (0.049)  0.022  (0.061)  -0.051  (0.050)  0.198  (0.067)  0.642 540,699 
Notes: Each row represents a separate hedonic regression. An observation is a transaction. The coefficient and standard error are those on a dummy for whether the specific product 
(bar code) is organic. Standard errors are clustered at the product level. The adjusted R
2 is from the overall regression. The numbers indicate the number of characteristics of each 
type appear in the hedonic regression. For example, for Bacon Rashers there are 3 brand characteristics (Branded, Budget or Standard Private Label), 4 origin characteristics 
(Britain, Ireland, Northern Europe and Other) and 2 variety characteristics (smoked or unsmoked). In all regressions there are 5 size categories, 8 store indicators (see Table 2), time 
and region effects. The final column shows the number of  observations.  46 
 
 
Table 5:  estimated household lower bound on willingness to pay for organic over a year 
Household lower bound on 
willingness to pay for organic 
over a year 
Number of 
households
% of households  Cumulative % of 
households
0 3,918 23.21  23.21
less than £1  4,401 26.07  49.28
£1 - £5  5,361 31.76  81.04
£5 - £10  1,540 9.12  90.16
£10 - £50  1,396 8.27  98.43
£50 - £100  142 0.84  99.27
over £100  123 0.73  100.00
Total  16,881 100.00 
Note: Data include 16,881 households over calendar year 2004.Each household's lower bound is calculated 
as in equation (4) using the estimated coefficients summarised in Table 4. 
 
Table 6: estimated household lower bound on willingness to pay as a share of expenditure on organic 
products 
Household lower bound on 
willingness to pay as a share of 
expenditure on organic products 
Number of 
households
% of households  Cumulative % of 
households
0 3,918 23.21  23.21
less than 10%  1,197 7.09  30.30
10% - 15%  1,779 10.54  40.84
15% - 20%  2,709 16.05  56.89
20% - 25%  2,873 17.02  73.91
25% - 50%  4,114 24.37  98.28
over 50%  291 1.72  100.00
Total  16,881 100.00 
Note: Data include 16,881 households over calendar year 2004.Each household's lower bound is calculated 
as in equation (4), using the estimated coefficients summarised in Table 4, and taken as a share of the 
household's total expenditure on organic products. 
 
 
Table 7:  estimated household upper bound on willingness to pay as a share of expenditure on non-
organic products 
Household upper bound on 
willingness to pay as a share of 
expenditure on organic products 
Number of 
households
% of households  Cumulative % of 
households
0 64 0.38  0.38
less than 20%  498 2.95  3.33
20% - 30%  5,738 33.99  37.32
30% - 40%  8,615 51.03  88.35
40% - 50%  1,869 11.07  99.43
over 50%  97 0.57  100.00
Total  16,881 100.00 
Note: Data include 16,881 households over calendar year 2004. Each household's upper bound is calculated 
as in equation (5), using the estimated coefficients summarised in Table 4, and taken as a share of the 
household's total expenditure on non-organic products.  47 
 
Table 8: Health, share of expenditure on organic, lower bound on wtp as share of total expenditure and number of households 
    Organic Products Are Healthier 
   Agree  Strongly/Agree  Agree Nor Disagree/Disagree 
/Strongly Disagree 
I Try To Buy a Healthy Range Of 








    








Note: In each cell the top % indicates the share of total household expenditure that is on organic products, the second % indicates the mean lower bound on 





Table 9: Environment, share of expenditure on organic, lower bound on wtp as share of total expenditure and number of households 
    Organic Products Are Friendlier To The Environment 
   Agree  Strongly/Agree  Agree Nor Disagree/Disagree 
/Strongly Disagree 









    








Note: In each cell the top % indicates the share of total household expenditure that is on organic products, the second % indicates the mean lower bound on 




Table 10: Quality, share of expenditure on organic and number of households 
`    Organic Foods Are Better Quality 48 
 
   Agree  Strongly/Agree  Agree Nor Disagree/Disagree 
/Strongly Disagree 








    








Note: In each cell the top % indicates the share of total household expenditure that is on organic products, the second % indicates the mean lower bound on 
willingness to pay by households in that cell, and the number in () indicates the number of households that selected the indicated response. 
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Table 11: Determinants of lower bound on willingness to pay for organic 
Dep var: lower bound on willingness to pay for 
organic in £  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 









Health important  5.783*** 5.307*** 4.784*** 7.676*** 4.641*** 3.914*** 
[0.534] [0.549] [0.515] [1.989] [0.658] [0.864] 
Health (upper right quadrant  of Table 8)  -0.962 -1.147*  -5.747* -1.007  -0.125 
[0.601] [0.610] [3.126] [0.858] [0.707] 
Health (bottom left quadrant of Table 8)  -0.608*** -1.026***  -2.382**  -1.252***  -0.102 
[0.154] [0.184] [1.129] [0.220] [0.182] 
Environment important  1.733*** 2.195*** 1.689***  2.277  1.581**  1.822** 
[0.651] [0.566] [0.524] [2.317] [0.643] [0.790] 
Environment (upper right quadrant  of Table 9)  0.727 0.414 3.98* 0.249 -0.131 
[0.466] [0.481] [2.302] [0.615] [0.562] 
Environment (bottom left quadrant of Table 9)  -0.0115 -0.36* -1.766* -0.114  -0.338 
[0.172] [0.187] [1.021] [0.243] [0.236] 
Quality important  8.711*** 8.522*** 7.988***  8.239**  9.126*** 4.955*** 
[1.129] [1.159] [1.095] [3.906] [1.421] [1.434] 
Quality  (upper right quadrant  of Table 10)  -0.647 -0.341 1.882 -0.873 0.806 
[0.839] [0.799] [4.642] [0.798] [1.519] 
Quality (bottom left quadrant of Table 10)  -0.102 -0.736***  -2.669**  -0.461** -0.597* 
[0.179] [0.213] [1.208] [0.227] [0.327] 
Household Class A or B  3.126*** 
[0.799] 
Household class C1 or C2  0.346 
[0.267] 
Single young  3.06*** 7.009  2.854***  2.156*** 
[0.747] [5.692] [0.907] [0.568] 50 
 
Table 11: Determinants of lower bound on willingness to pay for organic 
Dep var: lower bound on willingness to pay for 
organic in £  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 









Single with kids  1.799*** 9.439  0.979 1.707*** 
[0.570] [6.832] [0.712] [0.522] 
Single pensioner  3.064*** 6.426  1.757*  2.974*** 
[0.732] [5.988] [0.989] [0.612] 
Couple no kids  2.389*** 3.669 2.286***  1.974*** 
[0.569] [3.558] [0.728] [0.735] 
Couple with kids  0.729 -0.325 0.867 0.246 
[0.456] [2.664] [0.661] [0.433] 
Couple pensioner  1.697*** 1.887 2.016***  1.511*** 
[0.527] [3.228] [0.920] [0.452] 
Other no kids  1.796*** 0.653  1.116 3.003*** 
[0.599] [3.289] [0.738] [0.946] 
At least one vegetarian in the household  3.807*** 3.853  5.061**  0.5 
[1.620] [4.957] [2.284] [1.061] 
Annual expenditure on alcohol, food, toiletries   3.21*** 8.19** 2.76***  2.21*** 
and cleaning products (in £,000s)  [0.526] [3.96] [0.421]  [0.299] 
Response to attitudinal question missing  -1.143*** -1.07***  -0.89***  -3.139*  -0.706*  -0.839*** 
[0.212] [0.217] [0.248] [1.759] [0.384] [0.261] 
Constant 2.204***  2.417***  -5.65***  -13.54  -4.391***  -3.559*** 
[0.112] [0.156] [1.223] [9.862] [1.182] [0.707] 
Observations  13591 13591 13489  1343  7781  4365 
R-squared  0.058 0.059 0.091 0.107 0.092  0.11 
Notes: Standard errors in [] are robust. See Table 12 for means of variables and notes to Table 12 for definition of social class. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.151 
 
 
Table 12: mean of demographic variables 
Variable mean  (s.d.) 
Family type = Single young  0.082 
  (0.274) 
Family type =Single parent   0.062 
  (0.242) 
Family type = Single pensioner  0.075 
  (0.263) 
Family type = Couple no children  0.135 
  (0.341) 
Family type = Couple with children  0.396 
  (0.489) 
Family type = Pensioner couple  0.117 
  (0.321) 
Family type = Others no children  0.085 
  (0.278) 
Family type = Others with children  0.0483 
  (0.137) 
Annual expenditure on alcohol, food, toiletries and 
cleaning products 
2048.07 
  (1048.23) 
Household Professional Class (A or B)  0.100 
  (0.300) 
Household Skilled Class (C1 or C2)  0.577 
  (0.494) 
At least one vegetarian in the household  0.023 
  (0.149) 
Demographics or attitudes missing  0.036 
  (0.187) 
Notes: Social class is A (upper middle class - higher managerial, administrative or professional), B (middle 
class - intermediate managerial, administrative or professional) C1 (lower middle class - supervisory or 
clerical, junior managerial, administrative or professional) or C2 (skilled working class - skilled manual 
workers) (the omitted category is D (working class - semi and unskilled manual workers) and E (those at lowest 





Table 13: Upper bound on revenue increase from converting to only organic eggs 












on % increase 
in revenue if 
all products 
organic
    
Eggs    
Asda 26%  54.4 4.0% 69.8  28.4%
M&S 42%  3.0 19.8% 4.3  42.0%
Sainsbury 40%  50.2 14.8% 77.3  54.2%
Safeway 49%  20.0 5.9% 29.2  46.4%
Tesco 44%  94.3 6.2% 143.2  52.1%
Waitrose 44%  7.3 13.6% 10.7  47.6%
Other 31%  93.0 2.9% 125.3  35.1%
    





Asda 40%  139.4 1.7% 207.4  48.9%
M&S 15%  18.1 4.6% 20.9  15.1%
Sainsbury 57%  182.4 5.0% 314.5  72.7%
Safeway 47%  62.4 1.0% 99.0  58.9%
Tesco 46%  280.0 3.3% 436.2  55.9%
Waitrose 44%  31.6 15.3% 46.2  46.5%
Other 46%  228.1 0.8% 359.0  57.8%
    
Note: Data include 16,881 households over calendar year 2004. All values are sampled expenditure 
grossed-up  by household demographic weight in the sample relative to the UK population. 
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Figure 1: Organic price premia, across all goods and store fascia  
 
Notes: The histogram shows the (unweighted) distribution of all 518 estimated price premia on the organic characteristic.54 
 
Figure 2: Organic price premia, by store fascia (only coefficients that are significantly different than zero at 5% level) 
 
Notes: The histogram shows the (unweighted) distribution of all 74 estimated price premia on the organic characteristic by fascia. 